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Abstract—Automated filtering of toxic conversations may help
an Open-source software (OSS) community to maintain healthy
interactions among the project participants. Although, several
general purpose tools exist to identify toxic contents, those may
incorrectly flag some words commonly used in the Software
Engineering (SE) context as toxic (e.g., ‘junk’, ‘kill’, and ‘dump’)
and vice versa. To encounter this challenge, an SE specific
tool has been proposed by the CMU Strudel Lab (referred as
the ‘STRUDEL’ hereinafter) by combining the output of the
Perspective API with the output from a customized version of the
Stanford’s Politeness detector tool. However, since STRUDEL’s
evaluation was very limited with only 654 SE text, its practical
applicability is unclear. Therefore, this study aims to empirically
evaluate the Strudel tool as well as four state-of-the-art general
purpose toxicity detectors on a large scale SE dataset. On this
goal, we empirically developed a rubric to manually label toxic
SE interactions. Using this rubric, we manually labeled a dataset
of 6,533 code review comments and 4,140 Gitter messages. The
results of our analyses suggest significant degradation of all
tools’ performances on our datasets. Those degradations were
significantly higher on our dataset of formal SE communication
such as code review than on our dataset of informal commu-
nication such as Gitter messages. Two of the models from our
study showed significant performance improvements during 10-
fold cross validations after we retrained those on our SE datasets.
Based on our manual investigations of the incorrectly classified
text, we have identified several recommendations for developing
an SE specific toxicity detector.
Index Terms—toxicity, code review, developer communication,
evaluation
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior research have found multiple evidence of toxic inter-
actions, such as: profanity, insult, hate speech, identity attack,
misogynistic remarks, flirtations, or sexual innuendos, among
several Free / Open Source Software (FOSS) projects [1]–[5].
Toxic interactions may have serious repercussions on a FOSS
project. For example, a victim of toxic conversation may be-
come afraid to express him/herself, therefore get demotivated,
and may eventually leave the project.
The problem of online toxic conversations are more
widespread than the FOSS projects. For example, a 2017
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that two
out of five Americans have experienced online harassment [6].
Another study found 43% college students reporting being
recipients of harassing messages [7]. More than one-third
victims of those abusive online interactions reported feeling
depressed [7]. Therefore, researchers have been focusing on
automatic identification of toxic online conversations [8]–[12]
to prevent such negative incidents. Jigsaw (a unit of Google)1
is on the forefront of this research with building a public API
named the Perspective API2 to automatically score perceived
toxicity of a text. Kaggle3, in collaboration with the Jigsaw,
started a competition called ‘Toxic Comment Classification
Challenge in 2018’ 4 with the goal of building a classifier that
can classify toxic contents better than the Perspective API.
This challenge have produced high quality toxicity detectors
with AUC 5 scores (i.e., 0.988).
Since software development is a collaborative activity, toxic
conversations within a team may not only degrade relation-
ships among team members but also have a great impact on
the productivity of a developer [13]. Fear of bullying can
refrain a developer from sharing his/her opinions or discourage
a newcomer from seeking expert suggestions. Prior studies
have found developers expressing frustrations over peers with
‘prickly’ personalities [14], [15]. Toxic conversations may
not only demotivate developers but also waste valuable work
hours [16]. Since software development communities, such as
the FOSS projects, are professional communities, automated
identifications of toxic conversations from software developer
communications are crucial.
However, as prior research on building sentiment anal-
ysis tools for the Software Engineering (SE) domain has
shown [17], toxicity detectors developed for other domains
may not work well on SE conversations. An off-the-shelf tox-
icity detector may incorrectly flag some words commonly used
in the SE context as toxic (e.g., ‘junk’, ‘kill’, and ‘dump’).
To encounter this challenge, an SE specific tool has been
proposed by the CMU Strudel Lab (referred as the ‘STRUDEL
tool’ hereinafter) by combining the output of the Perspective
API [8] with the output from a customized version of the
Stanford’s Politeness detector tool [18]. Since the STRUDEL
1https://jigsaw.google.com
2https://www.perspectiveapi.com
3https://www.kaggle.com/
4https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge
5Area under receiver operating characteristic curve represents ability of of
a binary classifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied.
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had a low F-score (0.57) during its limited evaluation with only
654 SE text, its practical applicability is uncertain. Therefore,
this study aims to empirically evaluate the STRUDEL tool
as well as four other state-of-the-art general purpose toxicity
detectors on a large scale SE dataset. On this goal, we
empirically developed a rubric to manually label each SE text
as either ‘toxic’ or ‘non-toxic’ and using that rubric manually
labeled two datasets of: i) 6,533 code review comments and
ii) 4,140 Gitter messages. Using these datasets, we evaluated
the five selected tools and answer the following three research
questions:
(RQ1): How do contemporary toxicity detectors perform on
an SE dataset?
Motivation: This evaluation will enable us to identify the
practical applicability of contemporary toxicity detectors
on SE conversations.
Results: None of the contemporary toxicity detectors
achieved adequate performances to justify practical appli-
cations. The F-scores of the tools included in our study
dropped more significantly on a formal SE communi-
cation dataset such as code review than on a informal
communication such as Gitter messages. The significant
disagreements between most of the tool pairs also suggest
that results of an empirical study using one of these tools
may differ significantly if we switch from one tool to
another one.
(RQ2): What are the categories of SE texts that contemporary
toxicity detectors are more likely to misclassify?
Motivation: This analysis will identify scenarios to con-
sider when developing a customized toxicity detector for
the SE domain.
Results: Most of the tools accurately identifies texts with
expletives or swear words. However, those tools fails on
words that have different meaning in the SE context.
Moreover, contemporary tools also fail on sentences ex-
pressing humility, where an author uses demeaning words
(e.g., ‘stupid’, ‘dumb’, and ‘idiot’) referring him/herself
or his/her own work.
(RQ3): Does retraining on a SE dataset improve the perfor-
mances of contemporary toxicity detectors?
Motivation: This analysis will show us the easeness or
difficulty in building a customized toxicity detector for
the SE domain.
Results: The results are highly promising with both of
our retrained models outperforming contemporary models
during 10-fold cross- validations on our SE datasets. A
large scale labeled toxicity dataset of SE interactions may
enable the development of reliable SE domain specific
toxicity detectors.
The primary contributions of this paper are:
• An empirically developed rubric to manually label the
toxicity of SE conversations.
• Two manually labeled toxicity datasets from the SE
domain, with one dataset including 6,533 code review
comments and the other dataset including 4,140 Gitter
messages.
• An empirical evaluation of five contemporary toxicity
detectors on two SE datasets.
• Empirical evidence depicting the possible development
of a reliable toxicity detector for the SE domain by
retraining exiting models on a SE dataset.
• A set of guidance for SE researchers on building cus-
tomized toxicity detectors for the SE domain.
• Enabling replication: To enable future studies, we have
made our dataset and results available online at: https:
//github.com/WSU-SEAL/toxicity-dataset
Paper organization: The remainder of this paper is orga-
nized as following. Section II provides a brief background on
prior research in identifying online toxic contents. Section III
details our research methodology. Section IV describes the
results of our empirical evaluation. Section V discusses the
considerations for building an SE domain specific toxicity
detector. Section VI discusses the threats to validity of our
findings. Finally, Section VII provides the future direction of
our work and concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Following subsections provide a definition of toxic contents
in the context of the SE domain and briefly describe prior
research in identifying online toxic contents.
A. Toxic Contents
Toxicity analysis is a natural language classification problem
of identifying toxic contents. However, prior research had dif-
fering views on which contents should be considered as toxic.
For example, the pew research center classifies offensive name
calling, threats, and sexual harassment [6] as toxic interactions.
Zaheri et al. includes insult, verbal sexual harassment, threats,
obscene languages in their analyses of toxicity [19]. Geor-
gakopoulos et al. included personal attacks, online harassment
and bullying behaviors among toxic interactions [20]. Kurita
et al. expanded their definition of toxic contents by including
texts that can be harmful or offending to the recipient(s) [9].
The Perspective API [8] defines toxic contents as “texts that
are rude, disrespectful, or unreasonable”. Since the SE domain
consists of professional communities, we adopt the following
expansive definition of toxic contents in our analyses:
“An SE conversation will be considered as toxic, if
it includes any of the following: i) offensive name
calling, ii) insults, iii) threats, iv) personal attacks,
v) flirtations, vi) reference to sexual activities, and
vii) swearing or cursing.”
B. Prior Research on Toxicity Analysis
The Jigsaw team from Google developed the Perspective
API to identify abusive online contents, which is considered
one of the contemporary state-of-the-art tools. The models
behind the Perspective API (PPA) are trained using manual
annotations from crowd sourced human raters based on a
published guidelines [21]. Besides the toxicity model, PPA
also provides experimental models to identify insults, pro-
fanities, identity attacks, sexually explicit contents, flirtations,
and threats in a text. However, PPA is not free from flaws, as
Hosseini et al. pointed out tricks to deceive the PPA [22].
Georgakopoulos et al. proposed a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) based model trained on the Jigsaw dataset
[20] and found that CNN based models performed better than
bag-of-words based models in identifying toxic texts. Recently,
researches have proposed several deep learning based toxicity
classifiers [23]–[25] and provided guidelines on improving
performances of these models.
Identifications of obfuscated or perturbed toxic words (e.g.,
‘fuc k, and ‘idoit’) have been a major limitation of toxicity
classifiers. Mishra et al. proposed a single embedding for
unseen words to classify the toxic context, which is able to
identify obfuscated and non-obfuscated words [26]. Kurita et
al. proposed a model called Contextual Denoising Autoen-
coder (CDAE) to classify toxic contents [9]. They leveraged
both character-level and contextual information in their models
to overcome the limitations of contemporary toxicity classifiers
in identifying perturbed toxic tokens (e.g., intentional typos to
evade detection).
Due to the biases among the human raters against certain
group of people (e.g., gay, lesbian, black, and muslim), toxicity
classifiers based on several dataset are biased against those
groups [27]. To overcome this challenge, Vaidya et al. pro-
posed a multi-task learning model to reduced identity biases
among toxicity classifiers [27].
Identifications of online bullying and hate speeches have
also been focuses of several prior works. Waseem and Hovy
proposed a set of 11 rules to annotate hateful tweets and
labeled more than 16K public tweets using these criteria [28].
Using this dataset, they prepared a dictionary of the most
hateful indicative words. Davidson et al. proposed a classifier
to identify both hate speeches and offensive languages [29].
Chandrasekharan et al. proposed a model named Bag of Com-
munities to identify abusive online interactions, where they
showed that models trained based on labeled data obtained
from one online community can be successfully reused to
identify abusive contents from a different community [30].
Although, toxic contents have been found among SE in-
teractions [1]–[5], most of the prior works in the SE domain
focused on identifying software developers’ sentiments [31]–
[33]. Raman et al. proposed the first SE domain specific
toxicity detector, and used that to study unhealthy interactions
among FOSS developers [16].
III. RESEARCH METHOD
Currently, the STRUDEL dataset of 654 texts [16] is the
only labeled toxicity dataset from the SE domain. Due to the
small size of the STRUDEL dataset, we decided to create a
new labeled toxicity dataset from SE interactions. Following
subsections describe our approach to select text for our dataset,
our manual labelling process, tool selection, and empirical
evaluation of the selected tools.
A. Data Source Selection
Since toxic interactions are not very frequent among FOSS
projects [16], [34], we looked into prior research and identified
following two mediums, where toxic conversations are more
likely to occur.
• Code review is a software development practice, where
a developer sends his/her changes to peers for manual
reviews. Although, code review is a formal process,
incidents of profanity or insults are not uncommon during
code reviews. [5], [34]. We selected three popular FOSS
projects (i.e., Android, Chromium OS, and LibreOffice)
as our data sources, since a recent research suggests
toxicity among code reviews of those projects [5].
• Gitter is an open-source instant messaging and chat
room system for software developers. Although Gitter is
similar to Instant Relay Chat (IRC), Gitter’s integration
with Github repositories has made it popular among
recent FOSS projects. Since prior research found toxic
interactions among FOSS IRC channels [1], [35], we
considered chat messages as one of our sources. We
selected the gitter channel of the Ethereum project 6, since
it is one of the most active channels on Gitter.
B. Data Mining
The code review repositories of the three selected projects
are managed by Gerrit7. We wrote a Python script to access
Gerrit’s REST API to mine all the publicly available code
reviews for the three projects and store the data in a MySQL
database. Using an approach similar to Paul et al. [5], we
identified the bot accounts to exclude the comments not written
by humans. We used the GitterPy8 library to connect to Gitter’s
REST API and download all the messages to our MySQL
database. Table I shows an overview of the messages mined
by our scripts from the four FOSS projects.
C. Dataset Generation
Due to the rarity of toxic interactions, a fully-randomized
selection of text from our data sources would create a highly
unbalanced dataset of less than 1% toxic texts. To overcome
this challenge, we adopted a customized stratified sampling
strategy [36] by leveraging the Google’s Perspective API. First,
we use the PPA to compute the toxicity score of each text. The
PPA score for a text varies between 0 to 1, which indicates
the probability of that text being toxic. Since a PPA score of
0.5 or above suggests a text as more likely to be ‘toxic’ than
to be ‘non-toxic’, we included all the texts with PPA scores
above 0.5. Based on this selection, we obtained 3,213 code
review texts and 1,950 Gitter messages.
Second, we divided the texts with PPA scores less than
0.5 from our two datasets into five equally spaced PPA score
groups with each group spanning an interval of 0.1. From the
code review dataset, we randomly selected 664 text from each
6https://gitter.im/ethereum/go-ethereum
7https://www.gerritcodereview.com/
8https://github.com/myuz/GitterPy
TABLE I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MESSAGES MINED BY OUR MINING SCRIPTS
Project Data Source Time period Total messages Toxic messages*
Android Code review: https://android-review.googlesource.com/ December 2008 to June 2019 152,065 647
Chromium OS Code review: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/ April 2011 to March 2020 1,176,642 2,485
LibreOffice Code review: https://gerrit.libreoffice.org/ March 2012 to June 2019 12,273 81
Ethereum Gitter: https://gitter.im/ethereum/go-ethereum June 2014 to March 2020 122,355 1,950
*As classified by the Perspective API
group. For example, we randomly selected 664 code review
comments with a PPA score between 0 to 0.1, 664 texts with
a PPA score between 0.1 to 0.2 and so on. Using this stratified
sampling, we selected additional 3,320 code review comments
that are classified as ‘non-toxic’ by PPA. Similarly, we selected
additional 2,190 gitter messages (i.e., 438 messages from each
group) with PPA scores less than 0.5.
In addition to these two datasets, we randomly sampled
2,000 ‘non-toxic’ and ‘1,000’ toxic texts from the labeled
Jigsaw test dataset [37]. We use this dataset of 3,000 texts
to evaluate baseline performances of the selected tools on a
non-SE dataset.
D. Manual Labeling
During the first stage of our manual labeling, we focused
on developing a rubric to manually label the toxicity class
of the selected texts. Our initial rubric was based on the
guidelines published by the Conversation AI team [21]. Two of
the authors independently went through 1,000 texts to prepare
a set of rules. Then, we had a discussion session to create
a unified set of rules for labeling. Using this set of rules,
two of the authors independently labeled all the selected texts.
Table II shows the set of rules with examples taken from our
dataset.
After the independent manual labeling, we compared the
labels from the two raters to identify conflicts. Out of the 6,533
comments from the code review dataset, the two raters agreed
on 5,950 comments (i.e., 91.1%). On the Gitter dataset, out of
the 4,140 messages, the raters agreed on 3,730 messages (i.e.,
90.1%). We also measured the level of agreement between the
two raters using Cohen’s Kappa ( κ) [38], which was estimated
as 0.727 for our code review dataset and as 0.781 for our Gitter
dataset. Kappa (κ) values are commonly interpreted as follows:
values ≤ 0 as indicating ‘no agreement’ and 0.010.20 as ‘none
to slight’, 0.210.40 as ‘fair’, 0.41 0.60 as ‘moderate’, 0.610.80
as ‘substantial’, and 0.811.00 as ‘almost perfect agreement’.
Therefore, the level of agreement between the two raters
during our manual labeling can be considered as ‘substantial’.
Finally, we had discussion sessions to review the disagree-
ments and come up with an agreed upon rating for each of
the texts with a conflicted rating. After the conflict resolution
process, we found 20% ‘toxic’ texts in our code review dataset,
while the Gitter dataset had 35.4%. Since real-time chats are
bit more informal than code reviews, a higher ratio of toxic
texts in the Gitter dataset may not be surprising. Table III
provides a brief overview of the Jigsaw sample dataset as well
as the two SE datasets after the completion of our manual
labeling.
E. Tool Selection
We selected total five tools for evaluation. We selected the
Perspective API [8], since it has been widely used, and is con-
sidered one of state-of-the-art tool for toxic text classification.
The STRUDEL tool [16] was selected, since it is the only SE
domain specific toxicity detector. The remaining three tools
for evaluation were selected based on following two criteria.
1) The design and evaluation of the tool was published as a
research paper.
2) The source code of the tool is publicly available for
download and evaluation.
Although, we noticed an influx of toxicity detector
publicly available on the Github (https://github.com/topics/
toxic-comment-classification) as a part of the 2018 Kaggle
classification challenge [39], most of those tools fail our first
inclusion criteria. In the following subsections, we provide a
brief overview of the five tools selected for our analyses.
1) Perspective API (PPA): The developers from the
Google’s Conversational AI and Jigsaw developed the Perspec-
tive API to identify abusive online contents [8]. The primary
goal of the PPA is to develop a online platform to reduce the
toxic comments and create spaces for healthy conversations9.
The Perspective API currently provides six different models
to rate the level of toxicity, profanity, insult, identity attack,
threat, sexual explicit from a text. The PPA scores for a text
from the six models vary from 0 to 1, which indicate the
the probability of that text belonging to a particular category
(e.g., toxic, threat, or insult) [40]. We use the publicly available
REST API to compute PPA scores for each text in our datasets.
Using the score from the PPA ‘toxicity model’, we classify a
text as toxic if it has a PPA score of 0.5 or higher.
2) STRUDEL Toxicity Detector (STRUDEL): Raman et al.
proposed the first toxicity detector for the SE domain recently
[16]. They observed that many texts were incorrectly classified
as ‘toxic’ by the PPA due to the occurrences of words that
are considered ‘toxic’ in non-SE context but are included
in the technical SE vocabulary (e.g., kill, abort, and die).
They developed an automated pre-processing model to identify
words that are significantly over-represented in a SE dataset
compared to general English and replace those words with
more neutral filler words. They used a modified version of
the Stanford’s politeness detector tool [18] to identify the
9https://jigsaw.google.com/
TABLE II
SET OF RULES FOR CLASSIFYING A TEXT AS EITHER ‘TOXIC’ OR ‘NON-TOXIC’ WITH EXAMPLES TAKEN FROM OUR DATASET
# Rule Rationale Example*
Rule 1: Inclusion of a profane or curse words in
a sentence would be marked as ‘toxic’.
Profanities are the most common
sources of online toxicities.
“we don’t want to fuck 64-bit bit up
like 32-bit was fucked.”
Rule 2: Inclusion of an acronym, that refers
to expletive or swearing, in a sentence
would be marked as ‘toxic’.
Sometimes people use acronyms of pro-
fanities, which are equally toxic as its’
expanded form.
“wtf is going on with this nonstop?”
Rule 3: Insult to another person or person’s
work would be marked as ‘toxic’.
Insulting another developer may create
a toxic environment and should not be
encouraged.
“YOU MUST BE A BIG FOOL”
Rule 4: Attacking a person’s identity (e.g., race,
religion, nationality, gender or sexual
orientation) would be marked as ‘toxic’.
Identity attacks are considered toxic
among all categories of online conver-
sations.
“you are twice as smart as a typical
stupid American consumer, you get to
have an unlimited number of children”
Rule 5: Threatening another person or a com-
munity would be marked as ‘toxic’.
Threats may stir hostility between two
developers and force the the recipients
leave the community.
“One of these days Im going to slap
you @****”
Rule 6: Both implicit or explicit References to
sexual activities would be marked as
‘toxic’.
Implict or explicit references to sexual
activities may make some developers,
particularly females, uncomfortable and
make them leave a conversation.
“i know but...well its like masturbating
vs sex you see what i mean ”
Rule 7: Flirtations would be marked as ‘toxic’. Flirtations may also make a developer
uncomfortable and make a recipient
avoid the other person during future
collaborations
“Just like how I told that woman I
thought she looked pretty. ”
Rule 8: If a demeaning word (e.g., ‘dumb’,
‘stupid’, ‘idiot’, ‘ignorant’) refers to
either the writer him/herself or his/her
work, the sentence would not be
marked as ‘toxic’, if it does not fit any
of the first seven rules.
It is common in SE community to use
those word for expressing their own
mistakes. In those cases, the use of
those toxic words to himself/herself
does not make toxic meaning.
“stupid me, my editor shows them the
same color and tricks me every time.”
Rule 9: A sentence, that does not fit rules 1
through 8, would be marked as ‘non-
toxic’.
General non-toxic comments. “you can delete this main logic as the
wrapper.py handles it for you.”
* Examples are provided verbatim, to accurately represent the context. We did not censor any text, except omitting the reference
to a person’s name.
TABLE III
AN OVERVIEW OF THE THREE DATASETS
Dataset # total texts # toxic # non-toxic
Jigsaw Sample 3,000 1,000 2,000
Code Review 6,533 1,310 5,223
Gitter Ethereum 4,140 1,468 2,672
politeness score of the pre-processed text. Finally, they used
an SVM classifier to classify the text as either ‘toxic’ or ‘non-
toxic’ by combining the PPA score of the unmodified text with
the politeness score of the pre-processed text.
The STRUDEL tool was evaluated using a dataset of
654 issue comments mined from Github, where only 167
comments were labeled as ‘toxic’. During their evaluation it
achieved a precision of 0.91 and a recall of 0.42 of their test
dataset. Moreover, on a dataset of 100,000 randomly sampled
GitHub issues it achieved 50% precision in identifying ‘toxic’
comments. In our evaluation, we use the pretrained STRUDEL
model available on Github.
3) Deep Pyramid Convolutional Neural Networks
(DPCNN): Johnson and Zhang proposed a deep neural
network based model for toxic text classification, which they
named as Deep Pyramid Convolutional Neural Networks
(DPCNN) [41]. DPCNN outperformed prior state-of-the-
art models on six benchmark datasets in both sentiment
and toxicity classification. A DPCNN implementation
also performed well in the 2018 Kaggle classification
challenge [39] by achieving an AUC score of 0.98. Similar
to the PPA, DPCNN also provides the probability of a text
being toxic from 0 to 1. In our evaluation, we use a DPCNN
model trained using the Jigsaw dataset. Similar to the PPA
scores, we used the threshold of 0.5 to consider the DPCNN
classification as either toxic or non-toxic.
4) BERT with fast.ai (BFS): Devlin et al. proposed a pre-
trained deep bidirectional representations from unlabeled text
language model called Bidirectional Encoder Representations
from Transformers (BERT) [42]. BERT based models are
currently considered as the state-of-arts in natural language
processing (NLP) classification tasks . Kurita et al. proposed a
toxicity classification model [9] by fine tuning a BERT model
for fast.ai library10 for the 11. A BFS model trained using the
Jigsaw dataset achieved one of the highest public AUC scores
10https://www.fast.ai/
11https://www.kaggle.com/keitakurita/bert-with-fastai-example
in the Kaggle competition [39].
In our evaluation, we use the publicly available python
implementation of the BFS kernel 12. We retrain a BFS model
with the Jigsaw dataset and were able to achieve the an AUC
score of 0.9853 (i.e., same as the listed public score). As BFS
also outputs the probability of a text being toxic from 0 to
1, we use the threshold of 0.5 to classify each text as either
‘toxic’ or ‘non-toxic’ based on its BFS score.
5) Hate Speech Detection (HSD): Davidson et al. proposed
an automated multi-class classifier to classify a text as either
a hate speech, or an offensive language or neither [29]. The
HSD model was classified using a dataset of 25K manually
labeled tweets and achieved a precision 0.91, recall of 0.90,
and F1 score of 0.90 during five-fold cross validations. During
our evaluation, we use the pretrained HSD models and classify
a text as ‘toxic’ if it was classified as either ‘a hate speech’
or ‘an offensive language’ by the HSD model.
F. Evaluation Metrics
In our evaluation, we use the following five measures to
compare the performances of the tools on our SE datasets.
• Accuracy: Accuracy is the ratio of texts that were
correctly classified by a tool.
• Precision: The ratio between the number of toxic texts
that are correctly classified by a tool and the number of
of texts that are marked as toxic by the same tool.
• Recall: The ratio between the number of toxic texts that
are correctly classified by a tool and the number of toxic
texts in the dataset.
• F-score: The harmonic mean of precision and recall.
• Cohen’s Kappa (κ): The level of agreement between a
tool’s classification and our manual labeling as measured
using Cohen’s Kappa (κ) [38].
We also calculate the level of agreement between each pair
of tools using the Cohen’s Kappa (κ) [43] to determine how
obtained results would vary if a different tool was selected for
analyses.
IV. RESULTS
The following subsections present the results of the three
research questions introduced in the Section I.
A. RQ1: How do Contemporary Toxicity Detectors Perform
on an SE Dataset?
Table IV shows the precision, recall, F-score, and accuracy
of the five tools, when evaluated on our three datasets. On the
baseline Jigsaw sample test dataset, DPCNN achieves the best
precision, F-score, and accuracy, while STRUDEL achieved
the best recall. Four out of the five tools (i.e., except HSD)
achieved ‘substantial’ agreement with the human raters.
On the code review dataset, the STRUDEL tool, which
is customized for the SE domain, achieves the best recall.
However, due to lower precision than the PPA, STRUDEL
falls behind in terms of both F-score and accuracy. Although,
12https://www.kaggle.com/keitakurita/bert-with-fastai-example/
HSD had the the second highest precision among the five tools
on the code review dataset, it also had the lowest F-score
due to its failure to identify (i.e., false negatives) toxic texts
that do not express hate speeches. DPCNN had the highest
precision, accuracy and kappa on the code review dataset.
The kappa values suggest that the five tools achieved at best
‘Fair’ agreements with the human raters and therefore may not
suitable to identify toxic texts from code review interactions.
All the five tools performed better on the Gitter dataset
than each performed on the code review dataset, since the
Gitter dataset has higher ratios of toxic comments as well as
higher number of messages with profanities. Similar to the
code review dataset, the STRUDEL achieved the best recall
on the Gitter dataset but falls behind the PPA in terms of both
Accuracy and F-Score. Both the BFS and the HSD achieved
high precisions, but failed to achieve high F-scores due to large
number of false negatives. The kappa values suggest that four
out of the five tools achieved ‘moderate’ agreements with the
human raters, which can be considered as improvements over
the performances achieved by those tools for the code review
dataset.
By comparing each tools performance on the two SE
datasets against its performance on the Jigsaw sample, we
noticed significant degradations of F-scores. Both precisions
and recalls of each tool dropped by more than 0.10 on the
two SE datasets. Among the five tools, PPA provides the best
F-scores on both of our SE datasets and may be considered as
the baseline for building SE domain specific toxicity detectors.
Table V shows the agreements between each pair of tools
measured using the Cohen’s Kappa (κ). Since we have five dif-
ferent tools, there are ten possible pairings. The highest level of
agreements were seen between the PPA and STRUDEL pairs
on the both SE datasets. Based on the κ values, agreements
between these two tools can be considered as ‘substantial’.
Since STRUDEL uses PPA scores as an input for classifi-
cation, ‘substantial’ agreements between these two tools are
not surprising. The only other pair that showed ‘substantial’
agreement is the DPCNN-BFS pair on the Gitter dataset, since
both DPCNN and BFS models are trained using the same
dataset (i.e., Jigsaw toxicity dataset), their agreements on the
Gitter dataset may not be surprising, while their ‘moderate’
level of agreement on the code review dataset deserves more
investigation. The lowest level of agreement was obseved
between the STRUDEL-HSD pair. These results suggest that
if an empirical investigation of toxic texts are conducted using
one of these tools, the results may be different if we select one
of the different tools, except for switching between STRUDEL
and PPA may still yield the same results.
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF THE FIVE TOXICITY ANALYSIS TOOLS ON THE THREE DATASETS
Dataset Tools Precision (p) Recall(r) F-Score (f ) Accuracy (A) Kappa (κ)
Jigsaw Sample (baseline)
PPA 0.762 0.986 0.858 0.893 0.775
STRUDEL 0.734 0.990 0.843 0.877 0.746
DPCNN 0.896 0.829 0.861 0.911 0.796
BFS 0.887 0.834 0.859 0.909 0.793
HSD 0.889 0.427 0.577 0.791 0.461
Code Review
PPA 0.397 0.762 0.522 0.720 0.351
STRUDEL 0.347 0.861 0.495 0.648 0.294
DPCNN 0.708 0.285 0.406 0.833 0.33
BFS 0.663 0.253 0.366 0.824 0.287
HSD 0.705 0.051 0.095 0.805 0.071
Gitter Ethereum
PPA 0.707 0.806 0.753 0.813 0.604
STRUDEL 0.626 0.880 0.732 0.771 0.542
DPCNN 0.901 0.511 0.652 0.806 0.532
BFS 0.892 0.524 0.660 0.809 0.539
HSD 0.978 0.238 0.382 0.728 0.283
TABLE V
LEVEL OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TOOL PAIRS ON OUR SE DATASETS
Dataset Level of agreement between tool pairs (κ)STRUDEL DPCNN BFS HSD
Code Review
PPA 0.777 0.225 0.221 0.033
STRUDEL 0.156 0.151 0.023
DPCNN 0.595 0.18
BFS 0.142
Gitter Ethereum
PPA 0.812 0.497 0.504 0.236
STRUDEL 0.383 0.39 0.168
DPCNN 0.759 0.49
BFS 0.481
Finding 1: While contemporary toxicity detectors have
moderate agreements with human raters on identifying toxic
texts from informal conversations such as chat messages,
they perform poorly on a more formal SE conversation such
as code reviews. Since only one out of the ten possible pairs
had substantial agreements with each other, the results of
an empirical study may significantly differ, if we switch from
one tool to another from those nine low agreement pairs.
B. RQ2: What are the Categories of SE Texts that Contempo-
rary toxicity Detectors are More Likely to Misclassify?
We conducted secondary investigations to identify cases
where most of the tools misclassified to identify the challenges
in developing an SE domain specific toxicity detector.
All the tools used in our study are based on supervised
models, pretrained with a large labeled datasets. However,
many of the words has different meanings in the SE context
than in general English. Most of the tools failed for such
words. In the following we list such words with examples.
• kill: is frequently used during code reviews and developer
chats to suggest killing a process or simply removing
a code snippet. For example, “yeah, they don’t seem to
be needed, so let’s kill them.”, suggests removing some
unnecessary code snippet, which was misclassified as
toxic by most of the tools.
• execute: refers to running a process or application in the
SE domain. For example,“ Any program executed by any
kernel thread, including usermodehelper, from rootfs will
switch to init?”, refers to running a program, but was
incorrectly classified as toxic.
• die, dead: Both ‘die’ and ‘dead’ refers to state of program
execution or code snippets and are often misclassified by
off-the-shelf toxicity detectors. For example, “Remove the
old, dead code.”
• garbage: is another word that can be used both in toxic
and non-toxic ways. For example, in “initialize init pid
to -1 here so it doesn’t have garbage in it”, garbage can-
not be classified as toxic. However, a developer referring
another developer’s code as ‘garbage’ would be toxic. We
noticed ‘garbage’ used in non-toxic contexts for most of
the cases and were misclassified by the tools.
• dummy: is often used to refer to placeholder files or
objects. “What is it used for? An empty dummy file should
work.”, is an example of misclassification of a text with
this word.
• junk: Under slang terms, ‘junk’ refers to male privates.
However, in the SE domain ‘junk’ often refers to useless
objects and can be misclassified. For example, “I’d like
to have that here too, since input may have junk data
after a valid CBOR.”
• dirty: In the SE domain, ‘dirty’ often refers to a modified
file or memory location. A misclassification with the word
dirty:, “why not place this in the dirty bits iteration? (with
a comment on why we need it for D3D11)”.
• trash: refers to removing file, code snippet or objects. A
misclassified example is, “You really don’t need to derive
from std::less¡¿. If anything, you should be deriving
from std::binary function, but it is really not needed for
std::set to work correctly, so I would just trash that base
class.”
• daemon: refers to a computer program that runs as a
background process in the SE domain. However, in a non-
SE domain, it may refer to something supernatural and
therefore, was classified as toxic. An example of such
occurrence is : “Based on the old version, it looks like
lxc should be built even if USE=daemon is not sent. ...”
• naked: is usually considered as a toxic word with a
sexually explicit reference. However, in the C program-
ming language a ‘naked pointer’ refers to pointers that
can be used to point to another object. Texts with the
word ‘naked’ was frequently misclassified during code
reviews. For example, “For now, let’s keep it like this,
there’s a discussion going on what to do with the naked
C++ pointers.”
• dump: can be used as a slang to indicate ‘the act of defe-
cation’. However, in the SE context dump often refers to
storing data. For example, an example of misclassification
with dump is: “Use json.dump, json.load instead of doing
your own string parsing. ...”
• stupid, dumb, idiot, fool, ignorant: Most of the clas-
sifiers marked all the texts with these words as toxic.
However, during both code reviews as well as Gitter
chats, developers frequently used those words to express
humility. For example, “Maybe a stupid question: where’s
this variable defined?”.
• CAPITALIZED ACRONYMS: In C or C++ constant
variables are often declared in all caps. References to
code segments are often included in code reviews. For
example, “Make this another DCHECK.” Some of the
tools incorrectly marked unknown capitalized acronyms
as toxic.
Finding 2: Many of the words, that are used under toxic
contents in non-SE domains, have different meanings in the
SE context, are more frequently misclassified by the toxicity
detectors.
C. RQ3: Does Retraining on a SE Dataset Improve the
Performances of Contemporary Toxicity Detectors?
While we intended to to reevaluate all the five tools after
retraining those on a SE dataset, it was feasible for us to retrain
only two models (i.e., DPCNN and BFS) with our dataset. We
could not retrain the PPA, since its source code is proprietary.
STRUDEL uses the PPA model and the dataset to customize
the Stanford politeness detector for STRUDEL is not publicly
available. HSD is a multiclass model with three classes (‘hate
speech’, ‘offensive’, and ‘neither’). Since our datasets are not
labeled accordingly, we excluded the HSD model.
We evaluated the the models using 10-fold cross-validations.
Table VI shows the average performances of the two models
after retraining on our datasets. Both of the models achieves
significant performance improvements after retraining on our
SE dataset. The DPCNN based model achieved an F-Score
of 0.88 on the code review dataset, which is better than its
baseline performance (i.e., F-Score of 0.86 on the Jigsaw
sample). But it under-performed on the Gitter dataset with an
F-Score of 0.731. On the other hand, the BFS based model’s
F-Score of 0.860 on the Gitter dataset was almost similar as
its baseline performance (F-Score of 0.859). However, BFS
under-performed on the code review dataset with an F-Score
of 0.731.
Finding 3: Both models achieved significant performance
boosts after retraining on our SE datasets. Two out of
the four models beat its’ baseline F-Scores achieved on a
non-SE dataset. A large scale labeled toxicity dataset of
SE interactions may enable developing SE domain specific
toxicity detectors that can be used for identifying toxic texts
from real-world SE interactions.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we evaluated five contemporary toxicity
detectors on two SE datasets. Following are the key lessons
obtained from this study.
1) Off-the-shelf tools are reliable in identifying profan-
ities. Profanities are the most common sources of online
toxicities. We found most of the tools highly reliable
in flagging texts with profanities. Therefore, if an SE
community only wants to flag profane languages, off-the-
shelf tools such as PPA can be useful with its profanity
detection model.
2) Off-the-shelf tools are not reliable on SE datasets. Al-
though, PPA and STRUDEL show moderate performance
on identifying toxic texts from Gitter messages, their
performances are not reliable on formal conversations
such as code reviews. Therefore, off-the-shelf tools must
be evaluated for reliability on a dataset drawn from the
study context before their application.
3) Retraining off-the-shelf tools on a SE dataset sig-
nificantly improves performance. While we conducted
a preliminary investigation by retraining two of the off-
the-shelf tools on our SE dataset, the results are highly
promising. We believe, if we retrain contemporary models
using a larger and more robust SE dataset than the
one used in this study and add SE domain specific
preprocessing, we can develop a reliable toxicity classifier
for the SE domain.
4) SE domain specific preprocessing may improve per-
formances. We noticed that several misclassifications
from the existing tools were due to code snippets included
in developer communications. Since SE domain specific
sentiment analysis tools also recommend filtering out
code snippets [31], we believe that preprocessing steps
to identify and remove code snippets may improve the
performances of SE domain specific toxicity detectors.
5) Excluding SE domain specific words may cause false
negatives. The results of RQ2(Section IV-B) illustrated
several words that may have different meaning in an SE
context. While using the approach adopted by Raman et
al. [16], we can replace these words with a more neutral
words, and reduce those misclassifications, this approach
may also generate false negatives if these words are truly
used to express a toxic opinion. For example, following
lists shows toxic usage of those words from our dataset:
TABLE VI
PERFORMANCE OF THE TOXICITY DETECTORS AFTER RETRAINING ON OUR SE DATASET
Dataset Tools Precision (p) Recall(r) F-Score (f ) Accuracy (A) Kappa (κ)
Code Review DPCNN 0.880 0.890 0.880 0.920 0.817
BFS 0.780 0.688 0.731 0.898 0.669
Gitter Ethereum DPCNN 0.840 0.670 0.740 0.910 0.692
BFS 0.838 0.884 0.860 0.892 0.773
• garbage: “Why you changed this to %ecx? it is garbage
here.”
• kill: “go kill yourself ”
• junk: “so I don’t have to clean up my junk after myself
”
• dirty: “Only if you promise to talk dirty to me”
• dump: “I wouldn’t recommend telling girls they are
pretty, I mean if it’s the first or second thing you say
your intentions are clear, you just want sex, and then
they dump you.”
• die: “well the US can go and die”
• dead: “... should just move over to ethereum immedi-
ately... no point in flogging a dead horse”
6) A reliable toxicity detector must identify the target
of words to identify expressions of humility. Sentences
using the words: ‘idiot’, ‘stupid’, ‘dumb’, ‘ignorant’,
and ‘fool’ to express humility were often misclassified
by the contemporary toxicity detectors. We found both
toxic and non-toxic usages of those words. Since during
expressions of humility, these words refer to the author
him/her self or his/her works, a reliable toxicity classifier
must identify the target of those words to identify toxic
contexts from non-toxic ones.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
The first threat to validity for this study is our selection
of data sources which come from four FOSS projects. While
these projects represent four different domains, many domains
are not represented in our dataset. Moreover, our projects
represent some of the top OSS projects with organized gover-
nance. Therefore, several categories of highly offensive texts
are underrepresented in our datasets.
Second, our stratified sampling strategy was based on the
scores provided by the PPA. Although, we manually verified
all the texts classified as ‘toxic’ by the PPA, we randomly
selected only 5,510 texts that had PPA scores of less than
0.5. Among those texts, we identified 513 toxic texts (9.3%).
Therefore, if the PPA misclassified some categories of ‘toxic’
comments and also our random selections missed those, in-
stances of such texts may be missing in our datasets.
Third, we accepted the default parameters for the selected
tools and did not use parameter tuning to improve perfor-
mances. Therefore, some of the tools may have achieved better
performances on our datasets through parameter tuning.
Finally, although we have selected a diverse set of tools
trained on different datasets, we may be missing some tools
that could have achieved a better performance on our datasets.
To enable evaluations of more tools on our datasets, we had
made those publicly available on a Github repository.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we empirically evaluated STRUDEL, the
only SE domain specific toxicity detector, as well as four
other state-of-the-art general purpose toxicity detectors on two
labeled SE datasets. We empirically developed a rubric to
manually label toxic SE interactions, and using this rubric,
we manually labeled a dataset of 6,533 code review comments
and 4,120 Gitter messages.
The results of our analyses suggest that none of the contem-
porary toxicity detectors could achieve adequate performances
to justify practical applications. The performances of the tools
included in our study dropped more significantly on a formal
SE communication dataset such as code review than on a
dataset of informal communication such as Gitter messages.
The significant disagreements between most of the tool pairs
also suggest that results of an empirical study using one of
these tools may differ significantly if we switch from one
tool to another one. One of the primary limitations of existing
tools are their failures to identify non-toxic contexts of certain
words that are commonly used in toxic contexts in a non SE-
domain but may have different meanings in the SE domain.
Sentences with source code snippets and with the words, such
as: ‘idiot’, ‘stupid’, ‘dumb’, ‘ignorant’, and ‘fool’ to express
humility were also frequently misclassified. We retrained two
of the models from our study on our SE dataset and obtained
highly promising results with two out of the four models
beating its’ baseline F-Scores obtained on a non-SE dataset.
These results suggest that the development of a highly reliable
SE domain specific toxicity detector is feasible by retraining
existing models on a large-scale and robust labeled dataset of
SE interactions.
Based on our investigations, we have identified several key
lessons that may help researchers in developing an SE domain
specific toxicity detector. The rubrics developed in this study to
manually label toxic SE interactions as well as the two labeled
datasets, which are publicly available, will be also helpful. The
future direction for this research include: i) the development
of a large-scale and robust labeled dataset, ii) the development
and evaluation of SE domain specific text preprocessing steps
to improve the performances of toxicity classifiers, and iii) the
development of a reliable toxicity classifier for the SE domain.
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